SKILL.md
Primary filemarkdown20 KBname: detecting-anomalous-authentication-patterns description: 'Detects anomalous authentication patterns using UEBA analytics, statistical baselines, and machine learning models to identify impossible travel, credential stuffing, brute force, password spraying, and compromised account behaviors across authentication logs. Activates for requests involving authentication anomaly detection, login behavior analysis, UEBA implementation, or suspicious sign-in investigation.
' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: identity-access-management tags:
- UEBA
- authentication-anomaly
- impossible-travel
- brute-force
- credential-stuffing
- behavioral-analytics version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 atlas_techniques:
- AML.T0043
- AML.T0018 nist_ai_rmf:
- MEASURE-2.7
- MEASURE-2.5
- MAP-5.1 nist_csf:
- PR.AA-01
- PR.AA-02
- PR.AA-05
- PR.AA-06
Detecting Anomalous Authentication Patterns
When to Use
- Security operations needs to identify compromised accounts from authentication log analysis
- Implementing impossible travel detection to flag geographically inconsistent logins
- Detecting brute force, password spraying, and credential stuffing attacks in real time
- Building behavioral baselines for users to identify deviations indicating account compromise
- Correlating authentication anomalies with threat intelligence for lateral movement detection
- Investigating alerts from SIEM or IdP for suspicious sign-in activity
Do not use for static rule-based alerting on single failed logins; anomaly detection requires statistical baselines across time and entity dimensions to reduce false positives.
Prerequisites
- Authentication log sources (Azure AD/Entra ID sign-in logs, Okta system logs, Active Directory event logs 4624/4625/4648/4768/4771)
- SIEM platform (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic SIEM) with at least 90 days of baseline data
- GeoIP database for location-based anomaly detection (MaxMind GeoLite2 or IP2Location)
- Python 3.9+ with pandas, scikit-learn, and scipy for custom analytics
- User identity context (department, role, typical work hours, location)
Workflow
Step 1: Collect and Normalize Authentication Logs
Aggregate authentication events from all identity sources:
import pandas as pd
import json
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from collections import defaultdict
# Parse authentication logs from multiple sources
def normalize_auth_logs(log_source, raw_logs):
"""Normalize authentication events to a common schema."""
normalized = []
for event in raw_logs:
if log_source == "azure_ad":
normalized.append({
"timestamp": event["createdDateTime"],
"user": event["userPrincipalName"],
"source_ip": event["ipAddress"],
"location": {
"city": event.get("location", {}).get("city"),
"state": event.get("location", {}).get("state"),
"country": event.get("location", {}).get("countryOrRegion"),
"lat": event.get("location", {}).get("geoCoordinates", {}).get("latitude"),
"lon": event.get("location", {}).get("geoCoordinates", {}).get("longitude")
},
"result": "success" if event["status"]["errorCode"] == 0 else "failure",
"failure_reason": event["status"].get("failureReason", ""),
"app": event.get("appDisplayName", "Unknown"),
"device": event.get("deviceDetail", {}).get("operatingSystem", "Unknown"),
"browser": event.get("deviceDetail", {}).get("browser", "Unknown"),
"mfa_result": event.get("authenticationDetails", [{}])[0].get("succeeded", None),
"risk_level": event.get("riskLevelDuringSignIn", "none"),
"client_app": event.get("clientAppUsed", "Unknown"),
"source": "azure_ad"
})
elif log_source == "okta":
normalized.append({
"timestamp": event["published"],
"user": event["actor"]["alternateId"],
"source_ip": event["client"]["ipAddress"],
"location": {
"city": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("city"),
"state": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("state"),
"country": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("country"),
"lat": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("geolocation", {}).get("lat"),
"lon": event["client"].get("geographicalContext", {}).get("geolocation", {}).get("lon")
},
"result": "success" if event["outcome"]["result"] == "SUCCESS" else "failure",
"failure_reason": event["outcome"].get("reason", ""),
"app": event.get("target", [{}])[0].get("displayName", "Unknown"),
"device": event["client"].get("device", "Unknown"),
"browser": event["client"].get("userAgent", {}).get("browser", "Unknown"),
"source": "okta"
})
elif log_source == "windows_ad":
normalized.append({
"timestamp": event["TimeCreated"],
"user": event["TargetUserName"],
"source_ip": event.get("IpAddress", ""),
"location": None, # Requires GeoIP enrichment
"result": "success" if event["EventId"] in [4624, 4648] else "failure",
"failure_reason": event.get("FailureReason", ""),
"logon_type": event.get("LogonType", ""),
"source": "windows_ad"
})
return pd.DataFrame(normalized)
# Enrich with GeoIP data for Windows AD logs missing location
import geoip2.database
def enrich_geoip(df, geoip_db_path="/opt/geoip/GeoLite2-City.mmdb"):
"""Add geolocation data to events missing location information."""
reader = geoip2.database.Reader(geoip_db_path)
for idx, row in df.iterrows():
if row["location"] is None and row["source_ip"]:
try:
response = reader.city(row["source_ip"])
df.at[idx, "location"] = {
"city": response.city.name,
"country": response.country.iso_code,
"lat": response.location.latitude,
"lon": response.location.longitude
}
except Exception:
pass
reader.close()
return df
Step 2: Detect Impossible Travel Anomalies
Identify logins from geographically impossible locations:
from math import radians, sin, cos, sqrt, atan2
from datetime import datetime
def haversine_distance(lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2):
"""Calculate great-circle distance between two points in km."""
R = 6371 # Earth's radius in kilometers
lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2 = map(radians, [lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2])
dlat = lat2 - lat1
dlon = lon2 - lon1
a = sin(dlat/2)**2 + cos(lat1) * cos(lat2) * sin(dlon/2)**2
c = 2 * atan2(sqrt(a), sqrt(1-a))
return R * c
def detect_impossible_travel(df, max_speed_kmh=900):
"""
Detect impossible travel events where a user authenticates from
two locations faster than physically possible.
max_speed_kmh: Maximum realistic travel speed (900 km/h ~= commercial flight)
"""
alerts = []
# Sort by user and timestamp
df_sorted = df.sort_values(["user", "timestamp"])
for user, user_events in df_sorted.groupby("user"):
successful_events = user_events[user_events["result"] == "success"]
for i in range(1, len(successful_events)):
prev = successful_events.iloc[i-1]
curr = successful_events.iloc[i]
# Skip if location data is missing
if not prev.get("location") or not curr.get("location"):
continue
if not prev["location"].get("lat") or not curr["location"].get("lat"):
continue
# Calculate distance and time delta
distance_km = haversine_distance(
prev["location"]["lat"], prev["location"]["lon"],
curr["location"]["lat"], curr["location"]["lon"]
)
time_diff = (pd.Timestamp(curr["timestamp"]) -
pd.Timestamp(prev["timestamp"])).total_seconds() / 3600
if time_diff <= 0:
continue
required_speed = distance_km / time_diff
# Flag if required speed exceeds maximum realistic travel
if required_speed > max_speed_kmh and distance_km > 100:
alerts.append({
"alert_type": "IMPOSSIBLE_TRAVEL",
"severity": "HIGH",
"user": user,
"timestamp": curr["timestamp"],
"details": {
"location_1": f"{prev['location']['city']}, {prev['location']['country']}",
"location_2": f"{curr['location']['city']}, {curr['location']['country']}",
"time_1": prev["timestamp"],
"time_2": curr["timestamp"],
"distance_km": round(distance_km, 1),
"time_hours": round(time_diff, 2),
"required_speed_kmh": round(required_speed, 1),
"source_ip_1": prev["source_ip"],
"source_ip_2": curr["source_ip"]
}
})
return alerts
# Run impossible travel detection
travel_alerts = detect_impossible_travel(auth_df)
print(f"Impossible travel alerts: {len(travel_alerts)}")
for alert in travel_alerts:
print(f" [{alert['severity']}] {alert['user']}: "
f"{alert['details']['location_1']} -> {alert['details']['location_2']} "
f"({alert['details']['distance_km']} km in {alert['details']['time_hours']}h)")
Step 3: Detect Brute Force and Password Spraying
Identify credential attack patterns across authentication logs:
from collections import Counter
def detect_brute_force(df, threshold_failures=10, window_minutes=10):
"""
Detect brute force attacks: many failed attempts against
a single account in a short time window.
"""
alerts = []
failed = df[df["result"] == "failure"].copy()
failed["timestamp"] = pd.to_datetime(failed["timestamp"])
for user, user_fails in failed.groupby("user"):
user_fails_sorted = user_fails.sort_values("timestamp")
# Sliding window analysis
for i, row in user_fails_sorted.iterrows():
window_start = row["timestamp"]
window_end = window_start + timedelta(minutes=window_minutes)
window_events = user_fails_sorted[
(user_fails_sorted["timestamp"] >= window_start) &
(user_fails_sorted["timestamp"] <= window_end)
]
if len(window_events) >= threshold_failures:
source_ips = window_events["source_ip"].unique()
alerts.append({
"alert_type": "BRUTE_FORCE",
"severity": "HIGH",
"user": user,
"timestamp": str(window_start),
"details": {
"failed_attempts": len(window_events),
"window_minutes": window_minutes,
"source_ips": list(source_ips),
"distributed": len(source_ips) > 1,
"failure_reasons": dict(Counter(window_events["failure_reason"]))
}
})
break # One alert per user per detection pass
return alerts
def detect_password_spray(df, threshold_users=10, window_minutes=30):
"""
Detect password spraying: failed logins against many different
accounts from the same source in a short window (1-2 attempts per user).
"""
alerts = []
failed = df[df["result"] == "failure"].copy()
failed["timestamp"] = pd.to_datetime(failed["timestamp"])
for source_ip, ip_events in failed.groupby("source_ip"):
ip_events_sorted = ip_events.sort_values("timestamp")
for i, row in ip_events_sorted.iterrows():
window_start = row["timestamp"]
window_end = window_start + timedelta(minutes=window_minutes)
window_events = ip_events_sorted[
(ip_events_sorted["timestamp"] >= window_start) &
(ip_events_sorted["timestamp"] <= window_end)
]
unique_users = window_events["user"].nunique()
attempts_per_user = len(window_events) / unique_users if unique_users > 0 else 0
# Password spray: many users targeted, few attempts per user
if unique_users >= threshold_users and attempts_per_user <= 3:
# Check if any succeeded (compromised account)
success_after = df[
(df["source_ip"] == source_ip) &
(df["result"] == "success") &
(pd.to_datetime(df["timestamp"]) > window_start) &
(pd.to_datetime(df["timestamp"]) < window_end + timedelta(hours=1))
]
alerts.append({
"alert_type": "PASSWORD_SPRAY",
"severity": "CRITICAL" if len(success_after) > 0 else "HIGH",
"timestamp": str(window_start),
"details": {
"source_ip": source_ip,
"targeted_users": unique_users,
"total_attempts": len(window_events),
"avg_attempts_per_user": round(attempts_per_user, 1),
"window_minutes": window_minutes,
"successful_logins_after": len(success_after),
"compromised_accounts": list(success_after["user"].unique()) if len(success_after) > 0 else []
}
})
break
return alerts
# Run detections
brute_force_alerts = detect_brute_force(auth_df)
spray_alerts = detect_password_spray(auth_df)
print(f"Brute force alerts: {len(brute_force_alerts)}")
print(f"Password spray alerts: {len(spray_alerts)}")
Step 4: Build Behavioral Baselines and Detect Deviations
Create user behavioral profiles and flag statistical anomalies:
import numpy as np
from scipy import stats
from sklearn.ensemble import IsolationForest
def build_user_baseline(df, user, lookback_days=90):
"""Build behavioral baseline for a specific user."""
user_events = df[df["user"] == user].copy()
user_events["timestamp"] = pd.to_datetime(user_events["timestamp"])
user_events["hour"] = user_events["timestamp"].dt.hour
user_events["day_of_week"] = user_events["timestamp"].dt.dayofweek
baseline = {
"user": user,
"typical_hours": {
"start": int(user_events["hour"].quantile(0.05)),
"end": int(user_events["hour"].quantile(0.95)),
"mean": float(user_events["hour"].mean()),
"std": float(user_events["hour"].std())
},
"typical_days": list(user_events["day_of_week"].mode().values),
"typical_ips": list(user_events["source_ip"].value_counts().head(10).index),
"typical_locations": list(
user_events["location"].apply(
lambda x: x.get("country") if isinstance(x, dict) else None
).dropna().value_counts().head(5).index
),
"typical_apps": list(user_events["app"].value_counts().head(10).index),
"typical_devices": list(user_events["device"].value_counts().head(5).index),
"avg_daily_logins": float(
user_events.groupby(user_events["timestamp"].dt.date).size().mean()
),
"std_daily_logins": float(
user_events.groupby(user_events["timestamp"].dt.date).size().std()
),
"failure_rate": float(
(user_events["result"] == "failure").mean()
)
}
return baseline
def detect_behavioral_anomalies(event, baseline):
"""Compare a new authentication event against user baseline."""
anomalies = []
event_time = pd.Timestamp(event["timestamp"])
# Off-hours login detection
hour = event_time.hour
if baseline["typical_hours"]["std"] > 0:
z_score = abs(hour - baseline["typical_hours"]["mean"]) / baseline["typical_hours"]["std"]
if z_score > 2.5:
anomalies.append({
"type": "OFF_HOURS_LOGIN",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"detail": f"Login at {hour}:00 (baseline: {baseline['typical_hours']['start']}:00-{baseline['typical_hours']['end']}:00)",
"z_score": round(z_score, 2)
})
# New source IP
if event["source_ip"] not in baseline["typical_ips"]:
anomalies.append({
"type": "NEW_SOURCE_IP",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"detail": f"Login from unknown IP: {event['source_ip']}"
})
# New country
if event.get("location") and isinstance(event["location"], dict):
country = event["location"].get("country")
if country and country not in baseline["typical_locations"]:
anomalies.append({
"type": "NEW_COUNTRY",
"severity": "HIGH",
"detail": f"Login from new country: {country}"
})
# New application
if event.get("app") and event["app"] not in baseline["typical_apps"]:
anomalies.append({
"type": "NEW_APPLICATION",
"severity": "LOW",
"detail": f"Access to new application: {event['app']}"
})
# New device
if event.get("device") and event["device"] not in baseline["typical_devices"]:
anomalies.append({
"type": "NEW_DEVICE",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"detail": f"Login from new device: {event['device']}"
})
# Weekend login for weekday-only users
if event_time.dayofweek >= 5 and 5 not in baseline["typical_days"] and 6 not in baseline["typical_days"]:
anomalies.append({
"type": "WEEKEND_LOGIN",
"severity": "LOW",
"detail": f"Weekend login detected (typical days: {baseline['typical_days']})"
})
return anomalies
def isolation_forest_anomaly_detection(df):
"""Use Isolation Forest for multivariate anomaly detection."""
# Feature engineering
features_df = df.copy()
features_df["timestamp"] = pd.to_datetime(features_df["timestamp"])
features_df["hour"] = features_df["timestamp"].dt.hour
features_df["day_of_week"] = features_df["timestamp"].dt.dayofweek
features_df["is_failure"] = (features_df["result"] == "failure").astype(int)
# Encode categorical features
features_df["ip_frequency"] = features_df.groupby("source_ip")["source_ip"].transform("count")
features_df["user_frequency"] = features_df.groupby("user")["user"].transform("count")
feature_columns = ["hour", "day_of_week", "is_failure", "ip_frequency", "user_frequency"]
X = features_df[feature_columns].fillna(0)
# Train Isolation Forest
model = IsolationForest(
n_estimators=200,
contamination=0.01, # Expect 1% anomaly rate
random_state=42,
n_jobs=-1
)
features_df["anomaly_score"] = model.fit_predict(X)
features_df["anomaly_probability"] = model.score_samples(X)
# Extract anomalies (labeled as -1)
anomalies = features_df[features_df["anomaly_score"] == -1]
return anomalies.sort_values("anomaly_probability")
Step 5: Implement SIEM Detection Rules
Deploy detection rules for common authentication attack patterns:
# Splunk SPL queries for authentication anomaly detecti